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Why do Students Migrate? 











The flow of students has grown very rapidly these last decades, and in some regions, has become twice as important as 
the flows of those seeking work. The purpose of this study is to explore the elements affecting students’ decision on 
migration. The two main elements affecting migration are wages, and quality of education. It should be stressed that the 
countries with the highest-quality education are not necessarily those with high wages. Therefore there is a need to 
explore whether it is quality of higher education or wage levels that determine the direction of student flows. 
First, we develop a simple two-stage model relating decisions on educational choices to those on job search.  Our model 
shows that student migration is towards countries with the highest quality of higher education.  
In the second part of this study, we empirically investigate our theoretical model using a panel data on European OECD 
countries. We use the Bologna process to outline which of the elements, wages or educational quality, determines the 
direction of flows. We find strong evidence of concentration of students in countries with high-quality education and 
not in high-wage countries.  
 
Keywords: :      Migration, Human capital, Students, higher education, Bologna process, Brain drain.   






In the past decade, mobility of young people has grown rapidly, and interestingly this flow is not 
homogenous. On one hand is the flow of individuals who are already skilled and who emigrate to 
work. On the other hand, are young individuals migrating to acquire education, and this flow is 
growing rapidly this last decade. In 2006, the flow of individuals who obtain education outside their 
country of citizenship was nearly five times what it was in 1975. Over time, this flow became larger 
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than the flow of workers. More specifically, from 1999 to 2006, the growth rate of student flow to 
the OECD countries was twice that of flows for the purpose of finding employment.
1 
The reason why individuals migrate is usually tied to economic opportunities. Therefore countries 
with high wages are magnets for migrants, and indeed the literature has focused mainly on the 
magnet of high wages. When analyzing migrant flows, we therefore face the question: Does a high-
wage country also attract those who migrate in order to acquire education? This question is 
interesting because the data show that the countries with the highest-quality education are not those 
with high wages. So do students migrate to countries with high quality of education or to those with 
high wages? 
The aim of this paper is to identify the reasons why students emigrate and to elucidate the pattern of 
flows between countries. The main question this paper deals is to explore whether it is quality of 
higher education or wage levels that determines the direction of student flows.   
The previous literature on migration has focused on two subjects in total dichotomy. On one hand, 
there is the literature analyzing the cost-benefits of students. On the other hand, there is the 
literature analyzing the labor market, and the migration of already skilled labor. Unlike previous 
studies, which have analyzed student migration and workers separately, we combine these two 
migration decisions into a unique model. We develop a simple two-step model that describes the 
decisions of an individual vis-à-vis migration and education.  In the first step, individuals decide 
where to study (i.e., in country of origin or in a foreign country); and in the second step, they decide 
where to work.  
This model will allow us to pinpoint the optimal decision of young people, as well as to analyze the 
effects of wages and quality of education on the decision making of students. We show that under 
reasonable assumptions, the main variable affecting the decision on the country of emigration is its 
quality of education. 
The second part of the paper is empirical, and tests the variables affecting student migration.  Our 
empirical work will show two main results: the first is that quality of higher education, and not 
wages, as was previously believed, affects the probability of migration. Our paper indicates that 
young people move to countries with high quality of education rather than to those with high wages.   
 The second main result is that there is a concentration effect. We find that not only does high 
education quality -- not wages -- affect migration, but when we focus on the top countries in terms 
of education quality and wages, we see that the movement will be to countries with higher 
education quality. 
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present a short overview of the literature. 
In section III we develop the model of migration. In the forth section we present the data, and 
explain the methodology. In the fifth section, we present the empirical results, and section six 
concludes.  
  
                                                  
1 The flow of workers has increased by 27% while that of students by 52%.    3
II. Facts and Related Literature 
Our research focuses on decisions made by young people vis-à-vis migration. The possibilities 
facing them are either to attend university in their home countries, or migrate abroad to attend 
university. This decision cannot be disentangled from the decision regarding the countries wherein 
they would like to work. Therefore, we will present in brief the literature on student migration, as 
well as that related to migration of skilled workers. We begin with some facts about migration. In 
Table 1, we present the data on student migration in general and from OECD countries in particular, 
along with data for some Mediterranean countries. Regarding the literature, we should note that 
almost no studies relate decisions of where to study with those of where to work. An exception is 
Kwok and Leland (1982), who developed a multiple equilibria model of migration based on 
asymmetric information, wherein students prefer to remain in the country where they attended 
university, due to a lack of information on the “value” of their degrees. So due to signaling, good 
students find it more valuable to remain in the host study countries to work. In consequence, 
students with less “internal information”, i.e., those with lower abilities, will be those who decide to 
return to their countries of origin.
2 We turn now to the literature focusing on student migration. 
 
1. Student Migration 
The literature on student flow is not large, and is mainly empirical. The studies mainly outline the 
elements affecting the costs and benefits of migration for students who decide whether to acquire 
education abroad (see Kyung, 1996; Bessey, 2006; and Agasisti and Dal Bianco, 2007). Heaton and 
Throsby (1998) analyzes the determinants of flows in a cost-benefits framework.
3 
The literature has stressed that wage level is one of the main elements affecting the decision to 
migrate as a student. On one hand, Mac and Moncur (2001) found that higher wages in the country 
of origin positively affect the rate of out-migration. It is so, because agents with higher income can 
bear the costs of migration more easily and have better possibilities to invest in high quality of 
education.  On the other hand, wage differences between the host country and the country of origin 
are used to explain the patterns of migration. These studies show that flows of students are from 
low-wage to high-wage countries because students are motivated by the wish to exploit the 
opportunity to acquire employment in the country wherein they acquired their education (see 
Rosenzweig, 2006).  
There is also a literature which focuses on the macro effects of migration. Papatisba (2005) argued 
that studying overseas enhance the social and cultural development of migrants and therefore leads 
to human capital gains. Moreover, she stresses that migration could be a political means to foster 
technological transfers and economic integration of Europe. 
                                                  
2 Few models with multiple equilibria can be found in the literature on migration. Brezis and Krugman (1996) also 
presented a multiple equilibria migration model, yet without learning decisions and wherein the focus is on the host 
country, and not on the country of origin. 
3  See also Altbach, 1998.    4
Some scholars emphasize also the negative effects of migration on the stock of human capital. 
Poutvaara (2004) argued that while migration fosters private investment in human capital, it will 
lead to a reduction of public investment in education, due to free riding.  
Following this line of reasoning, Mectenberg and Strausz (2008) underlined the tradeoff facing 
government, i.e., competition versus free riding. On one hand, a central planner may decide to 
invest in quality of higher education in order to attract foreign students, and due to more 
competition, increases the amount of investment. On the other hand, the central planner might 
encourage local students to obtain education overseas free of charge. This free-riding on the account 
of another country reduces the total amount of investment in higher education. 
There are also studies on the effects of migration on the social environment as more migration will 
lead to a reduction in cultural differences over time (see Putvaara, 2004 and Mechtenberg and 
Strausz, 2008). We now turn to the literature on the migration of workers.  
  
2. Migration of workers 
In contrast to the literature on student migration, the literature on workers’ migration is vast. From 
Sjaastad (1962) on, the optimal behavior of migrants has been found to be a function of income 
differences and migration costs.
4 The main elements that have been emphasized are those affecting 
migration costs, as for instance, geographical distance, family size, and previous migration. A 
summary of the empirical work in this field is presented in Table 2, where we have outlined the 
main papers.
5 This literature did not focus on skilled workers. 
The literature on the migration of skilled workers is coined the "brain drain" literature which 
emphasizes the negative effects of the flight of skilled workers on the country of origin. These 
studies claim that the flight of skilled workers towards countries with higher standards of living lead 
to impoverishment of developing countries, due to increasing returns and externalities in the level 
of human capital. These papers conclude that migration of skilled labor has negative effects on 
human capital and economic growth of the country of origin.
6  
Lately, a number of authors have shown that the possibility of migration might create some positive 
effects on the country of origin, termed the "brain gain" effect. This line of research has been 
engaged in by Mountford (1997), Stark, et al. (1997, 1998) and Stark (2004). They focus on the fact 
that the incentive to migrate could increase the investment in education, and on average would 
increase the level of human capital. Beine, et al. (2001) and Easterly and Nyarko (2008) both derive 
the theoretical effects of migration on human capital creation, and test these effects empirically. 
                                                  
4 See Borjas (1987, 1989) and Chiswick 1999 (   ). The seminal work of Harris and Todaro (1970) adds to previous work 
the possibility of unemployment, and therefore focuses on the net expected present value as the element that explains 
migration. 
5 As shown in Table 2, the main empirical papers in this literature are those of Greenwood (1969), Bowles (1970), 
Kaluzny (1975), Lee and Roseman (1999), and Ahn et al. (1999). The variables on which they focus are mainly income, 
age, and distance unemployment. 
6 See Hacque and Kim, 1995 and Docquier, 2006. Early articles in this direction are notably Grubel and Scott (1966) 
and Bhagwati and Hamada (1974).    5
This paper will not draw a dichotomy between decisions on education and those on employment. 
Instead, it will combine these two into a one and single model. Let us now turn to presenting the 
model.  
 
III. The Model 
In this study, we develop a model that allows us to develop a cost-benefit analysis of migration 
decisions. Unlike previous studies, which have analyzed migration of students and workers 
separately, we combine these two decisions into a unique model. 
We develop a simple two-step model that describes the decisions of an individual vis-à-vis 
education investment. In the first step, individuals decide where to study (i.e., in country of origin 
or in a foreign country); and in the second step, they decide where to work. It should be noted that 
there are two main variables which determine the optimal decision.  The first one is the difference 
in wages and the second is the quality of higher education. Indeed, higher education is not 
homogenous between countries; there are main significant differences of quality between countries. 
In Chart 1, we show the elements affecting the decisions at each stage. 





In the first period, individuals invest in acquiring human capital, h, and decide whether to study 
overseas in country F, or in his home country, in country S. Their decision is a function of the costs 
and the returns from acquiring human capital. 
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1. Returns from Migration 
One main element which affects the future income of students is the accumulated human capital. 
This accumulated human capital is a function of the quality of higher education they have acquired. 
Students are aware that quality of higher education, Q is heterogeneous and varies across countries, 
and the higher the quality, the higher the human capital they are acquiring.  
The second element which influences the future income of students is the wages paid for a given 
amount of human capital, w.   So, individual's earning is a function of three factors: (i) the quality 
of higher education,  i Q  which affects the accumulated human capital (where j is the index of the 
country in which he gets an education), (ii) a idiosyncratic factor specific to the individual, λ , and 
in this section, we take λ  constant for all students, assumption which will be removed, when we 
will develop the macro equation of migration. (iii) The third element is the wage per unit of human 
capital,  j w   where j is the index of the country in which the individual decides to work (country S 
or country F).   
Therefore, individual's earning,  ij W  is a function of i Q , j w  and λ , and the income of individual is 
taking the four possible forms:   
 
(i)  Migration as student and staying to work – strategy  F A .      
Agents migrate in the first stage to country F in order to obtain education and remain there after 
graduation. We ignore the whole present value of income, and focus on the earning of a specific 
year, since discount factor will affect all incomes in the same way.  
The income in this specific strategy is a function of  F Q and  F w  and for sake of simplicity, we adopt 
this specific functional form: 
 
α λ λψ F F F F FF Q w w Q W = = ) , ( .  (1) 
   
where   FF W  are the earnings of an individual that obtains education and works in country F. (In 
chart 1, T represents the number of working years).   The second possible strategy is: 
 
(ii) Temporary migration – strategy  S A . 
individual migrates as student but returns to his home country after graduation. The earnings 
under this strategy is a function of quality of education overseas,  F Q  and wages at home,  S w : 
 
α λ λψ F S S F FS Q w w Q W = = ) , ( .  (2)   
 
(iii)Permanent migration only as worker – strategy,  F B  
The third possible strategy is that an individual will obtain education in his home country and 
migrate in order to work, following graduation. This is the regular “brain drain” strategy.  The value   7
of earnings under this strategy is a function of quality of education at home,  S Q and wages overseas, 
F w  : 
 
α λ λψ S F F S SF Q w w Q W = = ) , ( .  (3)     
 
(iv)   No migration –  strategy,  S B . 
 Individual  obtains  education in his home country and remains to work there following 
graduation. The present value of earnings over time under this strategy is: 
 
 
α λ λψ S S S S SS Q w w Q W = = ) , ( .  (4)   
 
So all four strategies present different returns depending on where the student learns and where he 
works. We now turn to the main costs related to learning and migration. 
 
2. Costs of Migration  
The literature of migration stresses two types of costs that individual bears during migration: 
financial costs and psychological costs. When migrating as a student,  we assume that the main 
financial costs of migration are tuition fees. Therefore, if the individual obtains education in his 
home country, the amount of tuition fees that he pays are  S F  and if he obtains education overseas 
he pays tuition fees which are charged in the host country,  F F . 
 
(i) Psychological costs 
Sjaastad (1962) argued that migrants bear costs which results from separation from family and 
friends. This definition of costs is known in the literature as psychological costs. The new literature 
developed by Akerlof and Cranton (2010) also put an emphasis on identity. This new literature 
takes into account that one of the main element people care about is their identity, or in other word, 
their culture. 
In consequence, when a person leaves home, he has the cost of leaving his own culture and 
adapting to the new one.
7 These costs are positively affected by the cultural differences between the 
sending and the receiving countries.   
   
This phenomenon of adapting to a new culture is coined as acculturation (see, Narchal, 2007).  
Theories of acculturation stress that the interaction between different cultures and adaptation to the 
majority's culture, lead to a process in which the migrants are losing their own cultural identity.  
This process bears psychological cost, Ps, which depends on the cultural differences between the 
origin and the destination countries. To leave the function as general as possible, we define: 
                                                  
7 Some psychologist will also emphasize the costs of loneliness and isolation; Others argued that as a result of changes 
in the identity of the individual, mental illness might appear (see Bhugra, 2004)  
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u S C P β = .  (5) 
 
where Cu is the differences between the culture of the migrant and the culture of the majority in the 
destination country, and β  is a positive parameter.    
Psychological costs are not the only costs faced by migrants. Students face also some compatibility 
costs.  
 
  (ii) Compatibility Costs 
The structure of higher education is heterogeneous. In some countries, the structure of higher 
education is typically of two cycles, while in others it is of three cycles. Furthermore, there are also 
main differences in the curriculum and language of teaching. This heterogeneity creates barriers 
which prevents movements of students. It is important to note that the Bologna process removes 
these barriers through harmonization of higher education in Europe.  
In consequence, we assume that the compatibility costs are function of the differences between the 
systems of higher education. The compatibility costs,  c C  are either zero when the two countries 
have the same system, or a positive amount K. 
   
In summary, the costs migrants bear, and the net income under each of the strategies are as follows:  
 
In strategy  F A , the total costs, C, are:  c F C Ps F + +  






In strategy S A , the total costs, C, are:  c F C Ps F + +  
                        and net returns are:  ) ( c F F S C Ps F Q w + + −
α λ                (7)         
(Cii)   
 
In strategy F B , the total costs, C, are:  Ps FS +  
                        and net returns are:  ) ( Ps F Q w S S F + −
α λ                           (8)        
(Ciii)   
In strategy S B , the total costs, C, are:  S F  
                         and net returns are:  S S S F Q w −
α λ                                        (9)       
(Civ)   
 
3. Optimization  
Individual decides whether to migrate for education purpose or later on as skilled worker according 
to the net return under each of the strategies. From comparison of the net returns under each of the 
strategies we get the following lemmas: 
 
Lemma 1: The choice between strategies  F A and  S A  depends exclusively on the wage per unit of 
human capital, ω .    9
For both strategies  F A and  S A , the costs of migration  (Ci) and (Cii) are equal. It follows that the 
differences between these two strategies is due to the difference in wages per unit of human capital 
in the location in which the individual chooses to work following graduation.  
Let us now compare the other two strategies,  F B  and S B . 
 
Lemma 2: The choice between strategies  F B and  S B  depends exclusively on the wage per unit of 
human capital, ω  and the psychological costs.  
From equations (8) and (9), it follows that decision between these two strategies depends on the 
wage per unit of human capital and the psychological costs.  This two-step model permits us to 
discuss the consequences of the Bologna process on migration of students.   
 
4. The Bologna Process  
The main goal of the Bologna process is to increase mobility of students within Europe in order to 
promote European citizens employability and the international competitiveness of the European 
higher education system. Since there are main differences among countries in their system of higher 
education, the aim of the Bologna process was to harmonize them. The main instruments for 
harmonization were: 
•  Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees, through the 
implementation of the Diploma Supplement. 
•  Adoption of a system essentially based on two main cycles, undergraduate and graduate. 
Access to the second cycle shall require successful completion of first cycle studies, lasting a 
minimum of three years.  (Bologna Process, 1999   )  
 
In fact, the Bologna process reduces compatibility and psychological costs, and eliminates tuition 
fees for European students in most countries. Therefore, we get that due to the Bologna Process, 
migration of students will concentrate itself into the countries with the highest quality of higher 
education. The reason for this effect is quite intuitive. When comparing the different net returns, it 
is easy to show that whatever the relative wages, the final decision to stay home or to learn abroad 
will be a function of the quality of education. 
In consequence, this model emphasizes that it is quality of higher education which is the main 
element conducive of migration and not the level of wages. We turn now to the section which 
permits to relate this macro result to the empirical analysis. 
 
5. The Migration equation 
In this section, we develop the migration equation, which will permit to relate the theoretic model to 
the empirical investigation which will be presented in the next section. 
The previous lemmas lead to the conclusion that under some plausible assumptions, the only two 
optimal strategies are strategy  F A i.e., to migrate as student and remain in the host country; or   10
strategy,   S B , i.e., not to migrate at any stage, recalling that the net returns under these two strategies 
are:  
) ( : c u F F F F F F C C F Q w NV A + + − = β λ
α            (10) 
   
      S S S S S S F Q w NV B − =
α λ :                                                                                    (11) 
In this part, we assume that λ is not anymore constant for all migrants, but is different among 
countries, as assumed in the model of self selection developed by Borjas (1987).  We define  F λ  and 
S λ  the returns on personal characteristics in country F and country S respectively. In consequence, 
we get the condition that: 
•  If    I> 0,   then individuals migrate;  
•  and if I<0, then individuals do not migrate,  





S S S S

















It follows from equation (12) that: 
 





           S F w w W ln ln − =   (14) 
 
            
α α
S F Q Q q ln ln − =   (15) 
 
         c u F S C C F F E ln ln ln ln + − − = β    (16) 
 
         ln ln FS X λ λ =−   (17) 
 
Therefore the probability, P, of emigration from country S to country F is 
 
         
) ( 1
) (
Pr )] ( Pr[ Z
E q W X









⎡ + + −
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where  ) ( E q W Z + + − = ,  X σ  is the standard deviation of X, and φ  is the CDF function of the 
normal distribution. From equation (18) it follows that the emigration equation from country S to 
country F is therefore: 
 






⎡ + − − + − + − −
− =
X










Let us now turn to the empirical section of this paper.  
 
IV. Empirical analysis 
 
Equation (19) permits us to present the specification of the empirical equation. We first present the 
equation, and later on discuss the data.   
   
1.The specification of the model  
In this empirical part, we regress the probability of migration as a function of the elements that 
appears in equation (19) of the previous section. In consequence, we estimate the following 
equation:  
 
(20)  12 3 4 5 6
78 9 1 0 1 1 55
F Pmig Wage Cu Tuition Tuitionsq EU Quality
Distance Similarity Language Top Wage u
=+Δ +Δ +Δ +Δ + +Δ
++ + + + + +
α ββ β β β β
ββ β β β ε
We investigate this equation with a country fixed effect, u and analyze a panel data of students’ 
flow published by the OECD on the years 2001-2006.  In this version of the paper, we focus on a 
sub-sample of the European OECD countries.
8 
The decision on migration is a qualitative variable, based on macro-data, therefore, we use a logistic 
transformation when estimating equation (20). Let us recall that in our theoretical model we used, 
as Borjas, the normal distribution while in this analysis we use the logistic distribution. Since the 
normal distribution and the logistic distribution are similar in their Bell curve and in their practical 




                                                  
8 The Bologna process provides a unique opportunity to explore the respective role of wages and quality of higher 
education in the decision on student’s migration, since the Bologna process reduces the costs of migration between 
countries. Therefore, we use two samples: the first is the overall sample which contains data on migration of students 
from the EU27, Switzerland and Norway towards twenty one European OECD countries. The second sample is the 
EU15 which contains data on migration within the EU15 area.    12
2. The variables of the model  
 
Pmig is the dependent variable which is a logistic transformation of the probability to emigrate 












where SF P  is the probability to migrate from country S to country F, calculated by dividing the 
number of foreign students from country S in country F, by the total number of students in country 
S. 
Wage Δ  is the difference in the monthly average manufacturing wage between country F and 
country S, based on the ILO database.     
Cu Δ is an index of cultural differences between countries. We developed this index based on World 
Values Survey which publishes data at an interval of five years.
9  
Tuition Δ is the difference in tuition fees between the origin and host countries. The data on tuition 
fees are based on the report by CESifo Dice for the year 2005. We should note that tuition fees in 
Europe are very low and in many countries students obtain education free of charge.
10  
Tuitionsq Δ is the square difference in tuition fees between the sending and  receiving countries.  
F EU  is a dummy variable which receives the value 1 if the destination country is a member of the 
EU.  
Quality Δ measures the differences in quality of higher education between the sending and the 
receiving countries. Our quality index defines the quality of higher education in a country according 
to the number of universities in this country which are ranked among the world's top 100 
universities. Therefore the quality of country is higher when it has more universities which are 
ranked in the top 100.  There are two main ranking of universities in the world – the THES and the 
SJTU (Shanghai Jiao Tong University). We have chosen to use the SJTU ranking since it uses 
criteria of research quality, research productivity, quality of the faculty and quality of teaching. 
Some previous work (Mac and Moncur, 2001) uses instead the expenditure on education, but 
OECD research has shown that the correlation between budgets and quality is weak.
11 
Distancemeasures the geographical distance between the capital cities of the origin and the 
destination countries. The series are based on the Gleditsch and Ward (2001) database. This 
variable is part of the compatibility costs included in the theoretical model. 
                                                  
9  We use the survey done in 2000. 
10 It is important to note that the EU forbids discrimination regarding tuition fees that are charged from EU, EEA 
citizens and citizens of countries which have special agreements with the EU. Since all the countries in our data are 
either EU countries or countries which have agreement with the EU, tuition fees are the same for local student as well 
as for overseas student.  
11  It should be noted that our own index has also some weakness, because many countries don't have universities which 
are ranked in the world top 100. As a result this index provides information on a limited set of countries.     13
Similarity is a dummy variable which get the value 1 if the structures of higher education in the 
host and origin countries were similar prior to the adoption of the Bologna process. We divided the 
countries into two different groups. The first group includes the countries which, prior to Bologna 
process, had the three cycles system, and the second group includes countries with structure similar 
to the German system. As we will show, this element is important for analyzing migration in 
Europe. Table 3 displays the percent of students who migrate to countries which has the same 
system as in their country of origin.  
For example, Table 3, row 1 shows that 81.3% of the Austrian students, who studied in 2001 out of 
Austria, chose to study in destination country which had, prior to the Bologna process, the same 
structure of higher education as in Austria. It should be noted that this variable is part of the 
compatibility costs presented in the theoretical model. 
Language is a dummy variable that gets the value 1 if the official language in the origin and the 
destination country is the same.   
5 Top education is a dummy variable which gets the value 1 if the destination country is one of the 
five countries with the highest quality of education according to top100 index of quality. In fact, we 
use this variable to measure concentration by quality. The top five countries are France, Germany, 
UK, Switzerland and Sweden.   
Wage5  is a dummy variable which get the value 1 if the destination country is one of the five 
OECD countries with the highest manufacturing wage. The top five countries are: Austria, 
Denmark, Holland, Norway and Switzerland.  
Finally, u represent a fixed country effect and ε  is the random error.  
  
V. Empirical results  
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 4. In all regressions, the dependent variable 
Pmig represents the transformation of the probability to emigrate from country S to country F 
according to the logistic distribution. 
In the first and third columns of table 4 we present the regression in the overall sample and in the 
second and forth columns we present the regressions for the EU15 sample. We divide our empirical 
results in two groups: the main results, and some more interesting results. 
1. Main results 
(i) Wages and Quality of Education  
Table 4, columns 1 and 2, present the results when we include as endogenous variables quality of 
university and the gap in wages between the country of origin and the host country.  
We find that in both samples (total sample and the EU15), there are significant negative effects of 
wage differences on migration of students (see columns 1 and 2). This result is interesting because 
the literature stresses that wages are a positive and significant element in the decision of student 
migration (see Rosenzweig 2006). Our paper shows that this is not so. The element which is 
important and positive on migration is the quality of higher education.      14
Quality Δ  - Following our theoretical model, positive quality differences between the receiving and 
the sending countries is expected to encourage students to migrate. Indeed, we find a positive and 
significant effect of the quality of higher education on the probability of students' migration (see 
columns 1 and 2).  
In conclusion, we find negative and significant effect of wage differences on migration of students 
and positive and significant positive effect of quality of education on migration. In other words, in 
contrast to previous studies, we find that the migration of students results from quality differences 
rather than wage differences.  
 
 (ii) Top Wages and Top Quality of education  
We intend to check whether quality of higher education or wage lead to some concentration effect. 
In order to explore this effect, we add two dummy variables in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. The first 
one is Top5 education. This variable gets the value 1 if the destination country is one of the top five 
countries in quality of higher education. This variable measures concentration of students in top 
quality countries.  
Similarly, we add the variable Wage5 which measures whether the destination country is one of the 
five countries with the highest wage. In other words, this variable measures concentration of 
students in high wage countries. 
The results show positive and significant effect of the top5 education variable and negative and 
significant effect of the wage5 variable. Therefore we find significant evidence that the pattern of 
flows is to countries with high quality of universities and not in countries with high wage.  
These results are interesting because there is a comprehensive literature on the impact of quality of 
higher education on labor outcomes, which have found positive effect of quality on wages. 
Therefore a priori, there is a common belief that countries with high quality of education are also 
countries with high wages.  
Is there a high correlation between wages and quality of education? In table 5, we present the 
correlation between wages and quality of higher education. We find that the correlation between 
wages in manufacturing in each country and its number of universities in the world's top100, top 
200 and top500 universities is around 0.35. Therefore the countries with the highest quality of 
education are not necessary the countries with high wages, as we have shown in table 4 that there is 
a concentration by quality and not by wages. 
The concentration effect stressed in Table 4 can be presented in a different manner in Tables 6a and 
6b, in which we present the distribution of student flows according to quality of higher education 
(in Table 6a), and according to wages (in Table 6b).    15
Table 6a shows that in all the years 2001 to 2006, around 67 percents of student flows in the OECD 
and EU countries concentrated into the top five countries in quality of higher education.
12 Are these 
flows also concentrated in the top five countries in wage? 
In table 6b we measures concentration in countries with the highest wage. We show that more than 
80 percent of the student flows went to the low wage countries. Therefore, unlike the concentration 
of students in high quality countries, we don't find concentration in high wage countries. This is the 
picture we got from the regressions presented in table 4. 
 
2. Some more interesting results 
Cu Δ - Following our theoretical model, wider cultural gap leads to higher psychological costs 
which reduce migration. The results we get support this relationship: Table 4, row 3 shows  that 
higher cultural differences, as reflected by the cultural index, reduces significantly the rate of   
migration in all four regressions.   
Tuition Δ - A priori, we expected to find negative effect of tuition fees gap on migration, but we 
found a positive one. Already Mak and Moncur (2001) found positive effect of tuition fees on 
migration of students, while Bessey (2007) found insignificant effect.  In this paper we also find a 
significant and positive effect of tuition fees gap on migration in both samples, meaning that 
students migrate to countries with higher tuition fees. This positive sign could be due to a signaling 
effect of the level of tuition fees on the quality of education.   
Tuitionsq Δ - The positive sign of tuition fees on migration led us to check whether there is a non 
linear relation between tuition fees and migration. The results are not clear cut.  
F EU  - We get a positive and significant effect of the host country being a member of the EU. There 
is clearly a club effect since migration to the EU area could raise the returns on migration. 
Distance – Similar to previous studies on migration, we find negative effect of distance between 
countries on migration. 
The next two variables, similarity and language, are related to the compatibility costs presented in 
the theoretical part. 
Similarity - measures similarity between the structure of higher education in the host and origin 
countries. When the structure of the systems is more similar the compatibility costs are lower. In 
our empirical investigation, this variable was not significant. 
Language – In all regressions, we find a positive effect of the same language in the host and the 





                                                  
12 More specifically, around 19 percent of students went from low quality countries to low quality countries. Around 48 
percent went from low quality countries to the top five countries, 14 percent from the top five countries to the low 
quality countries, and 19 percent were between the top five countries.   16
V. Conclusion 
 
This past decade, cross-national migration of young people has become an important issue in the 
policy arena for two main reasons. The first is that the European Union has decided upon 
establishment of a European Higher Education Area, thereby allowing and even encouraging free 
movement of students between European Union countries.  
The second issue related to migration of students is the increasing global competition on talents. In 
the past, the elite of most countries were educated in their own countries. Today, an element 
common to many of the elites is that they share a common education and for many of them, they 
have attended the same elite universities, which are not in their home countries. In consequence, the 
issue of social mobility has become linked to the international movement of students. An obvious 
question is then what determines the direction of student mobility?  This is the topic of this paper. 
In this paper, we investigate whether it is wage levels or quality of higher education that determines 
mobility of students. We also investigate many other elements of the migration decision, for 
instance language and distance, both of which we found influence migration. We also developed a 
cultural gap index that shows that a gap in culture reduces migration. Nonetheless, the main purpose 
of this paper is to analyze the relationship between migration, education quality, and wages. 
The first contribution of this paper is that it has stressed that to answer these types of questions, we 
cannot use a conventional model of migration which naturally limits itself either to student 
migration, or to migration of workers. We developed a two-stage model of migration that merges 
the decision to migrate as a student with the decision to migrate as a worker. Under some 
reasonable assumptions, we show that young people move to countries with higher quality of 
education.   
This issue might appear redundant, since a priori, countries with high wages will also be countries 
with high education quality. Yet among the empirical regularities exposed herein, we show that this 
is not the case: The correlation between wages and education quality is only 35%. 
The empirical analysis shows that while quality of education affects positively migration, wages do 
not affect positively migration. This is not our main result. We have tried to test whether there is 
concentration in specific countries. The answer is clear: Young people travel to the top five 
countries in terms of education quality. Our indices show a concentration of students in the top-
quality education countries, and not into countries with the highest wages. 
Nobel Prize Laureate Robert Lucas raised a famous query in his paper: “Why doesn’t capital flow 
from rich to poor countries?” Paraphrasing Lucas in our paper, we find that students’ emigration is 
motivated by quality of education and not by wages. Human capital doesn’t flow from poor to rich 
countries, but rather from countries of low-quality education to those of high-quality education.  
These are not good news for the Bologna Process. These are even worse news for developing 
countries in the border of the European Union, especially for the Mediterranean countries. Young   17
people will try to acquire higher education in the top countries in terms of quality of education, and 
brain drain will increase. 
However there is also some good news.  In order to develop, countries need bright people at the 
helm of the political and economic leadership. Countries do not develop if their elite is not well 
educated.  The Bologna Process leads to low tuition fees for all countries in the area. So the bright 
people from developing countries in which higher education is not of high quality can move and 
attend the best universities. Yet, will they return to their home countries?  
Some other good news is that the market for education is much more open and competitive than that 
for labor. The literature has stressed the lack of mobility in the European labor market. This paper 
shows that the Bologna process has succeeded in stimulating mobility. Is this good for Europe?  
The answer is mitigated. 
In conclusion, the Bologna process is leading to significant changes, not only in the market for 
education, but also in the labor market. The effects on the neighborhood countries are not clear. On 
one hand, it can lead to an increase in the loss of young bright people. On the other hand, it could 
enable providing a good education to the next generation of leaders. The new literature on migration 
(see Benassy and Brezis, 2010) has emphasized that migration of young people can lead to multiple 
equilibria:  Either there are some forces which will lead the young people to return to their countries 
of origin, be a source of economic growth, and become the next elite. Or, if there is no exogenous 
shock leading to this optimistic possibility, the flow of young people will increase and the home 
country can be caught in a vicious circle leading to some form of poverty trap. 
One possible shock that could lead to this improved equilibrium would be the requirement for 
exiting students to go back for a few years to their home countries. If all return, it would alter the 
existence of multiple equilibria, and over time the only equilibrium would be one of high wages, 
high growth; and overtime this exogenous shock would no longer be necessary. Therefore, this 
paper strongly recommends that with the creation of the European Higher education Area, and free 





   18
References 
Ahn, N., De la Rica, S. and A. Ugidos. (1999), “Willingness to Move for Work and Unemployment Duration in Spain”, 
Economica, 66(263): 335-357. 
Agasisti, T. and A. Dal Bianco. (2007), “Determinants of College Student Migration in Italy: Empirical Evidence from 
a Gravity Approach”, Working Paper series. 
Akerlof, GA and R. Kranton (2010),  Identity Economics. Princeton University Press 
Altbach, P.G. 1998. “Comparative Higher Education: Knowledge, the University, and Development”, Ablex 
Publishing. 
Bartel, A.P. (1979) “The Migration Decision: What Role Does Job Mobility Play?”, The American Economic Review, 
69 (5): 775-786. 
Baryla, E.A. and D. Dotterweich. 2001. Student Migration: Do Significant Factors Vary by Region?”, Education 
Economics, 9 (3):  269–279. 
Beine, M., Docquier, D. and H. Rapaport (2001), “Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence”, Journal 
of Development Economics. 64: 275-289. 
Beine, M., Docquier, D. and H. Rapaport (2008), “Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: 
Winners and Losers”, The Economic Journal, 118:  631-652.    
Benelux Bologna Secretariat. http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna   
Benassy, JP and E.S. Brezis (2010), “Endogenous Migration and Underdevelopment Traps”,  working paper, PSE. 
Bessey, D. (2006), “International Student Migration to Germany “,University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and 
Business Economics, Economics of Education Working Paper Series, n. 6.   
Bhugra, D. (2004), “Migration distress and cultural identity”, British Medical Bulletin, 69: 129-141.   
Borjas, G.J. (1987), “Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrant”, The American Economic Review, 77(4): 531-553. 
Borjas, G.J. (1989), “Economic Theory and International Migration”, International Migration Review, 23 (3): 457-485 
Borjas, G.J. (1999), “Immigration and Welfare Magnets”, Journal of Labor Economics, 17(4): 607-637.  
Bowles, S. (1970), “Migration as Investment: Empirical Tests of the Human Investment Approach to Geographical 
Mobility”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 52 (4): 356-362 
Brezis E.S and P. Krugman. 1996. “Immigration, Investment and Real Wages”  Journal of Population Economics, vol. 
9: 83-93. 
Brezis E.S. (2008), “The Effects of Globalization on Social Mobility: the Emergence of a Transnational Oligarchy”  UN 
working papers. 
CESifo. (2005), “Tuition Fees in Europe“, CESifo Dice Report: Journal for Institutional Comparison, 3(2): 55-57. 
CESifo. (2007), “Tuition Fees in Europe“, CESifo Dice Report: Journal for Institutional Comparison, 5(4): 56-58. 
Chiswick, B.R. (1999), “Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?”, The American Economic Review, 89 (2): 181-185. 
Docquier, F. (2006), “Brain drain and inequality across nations”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2440.   
Ehrenberg, R.G and R.S. Smith. 2002, “Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy”, Addison Wesley, 
Eighth edition.   
Ernest George Ravenstein E.G. (1889), "The Laws of Migration." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 52, No. 
2. (June, 1889), pp. 241-305.      
Gleditsch, K.S and M.D. Ward. (2001), "Measuring Space: A Minimum Distance Database and Applications to 
International Studies," Journal of Peace Research, 38, 739-58. 
Greenwood, M.G. 1969. “An Analysis of the Determinants of Geographic Labor Mobility in the United States”, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 51 (2): 189-194 
Gross, D.M. and N. Schmitt. (2003), “The Role of Cultural Clustering in Attracting New Immigrants”. Journal of 
Regional Science, 43 (2): 295-318. 
Grossman J.R. 1989, “Land of hope: Chicago, Black southerners, and the Great Migration / James R. Grossman”, 
University of Chicago Press. 
Grubel, H. and A. Scott. (1966), ”The International Flow of Human Capital”, American Economic Review, 56 (1/2): 
268-74. 
Hansen, M. (1940), “ The Atlantic Migration“, Harper&Row. 
Haque, N. U and S. Kim. (1995), ”Human Capital Flight: Impact of Migration on Income and Growth”, IMF Staff 
Papers, 42(3): 577-607. 
Harris, J. and M. Todaro. (1970), ”Migration, Unemployment & Development: A Two-Sector Analysis”. American 
Economic Review, 60(1):126-42. 
Heaton, C. and D. Throsby. (1998), ”Benefit-Cost Analysis of Foreign Student Flows from Developing Countries: The 
Case of Postgraduate Education”. Economics of Education Review, 17(2): 117-126. 
ILO. 2001-2006. Laborsta. http://laborsta.ilo.org    
Kaluzny. R.L. (1975), “Determinants of Household Migration: A Comparative Study by Race and Poverty Level”. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 57 (3): 269-274.   19
Karemera, D., Iwuagwu Oguledo,V. and B. Davis. (2000), “A Gravity Model Analysis of International Migration to 
North America”, Applied Economics, 32: 1745–1755..   
Karras, G. and C. U. Chiswick. (1999), “Macroeconomic Determinants of Migration: The Case of Germany 1964 – 
1988”, International Migration, 37 (4): 657-677. 
Krugman, P.R. and M. Obstfeld. (2005), “ International Economics Trade and Policy”, Seventh -edition, Addision-
Wesley Publishing company.  
Kwok, V. and H. Leland. (1982),  “An Economic Model of the Brain Drain”, The American Economic Review, 72 (1): 
91-100. 
Kyung, W. (1996), “In-Migration of College Students to the State of New York”, The Journal of Higher Education, 67 
(3) : 349-358. 
Lee, S. and C.C Roseman. (1999),  “Migration determinants and employment consequences of white and black families, 
1985 – 1990“, Economic Geography 75 (2): 109 – 133 
Li, M. and M. Bray (2007), “Cross-Border Flows of Students for Higher Education: Push-Pull Factors and Motivations 
of Mainland Chinese Students in Hong Kong and Macau”, Higher Education, 53 (6): 791-818. 
Lucas, R.B. (1988), ”On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22: 3-42. 
Mak, J. and J.E.T. Moncur (2001), “Interstate Migration of College Freshmen: An Economic Analysis”. University of 
Hawaii at Manoa, Working Paper, 11-5. 
McHugh, R. and J.N. Morgan (1984), “The Determinants of Interstate Student Migration: a Place-to-Place Analysis”. 
Economics of Education Review, 3 (4): 269–278. 
Mechtenberg, L and R. Strausz (2008), “The Bologna Process: How Student Mobility Affects Multi-Cultural Skills and 
Educational Quality”, International Tax and Public Finance, 15(2): 109-130. 
Narchal, R. (2007), “Migration: Destruction and Reconstruction of the Self”, E-journal of Applied Psychology, 3 (1): 
55-64. 
OECD. 2003-2008. Education at a Glance, Paris. http://www.oecd.org    
Papatsiba, V. (2005), “Political and Individual Rationales of Student Mobility: a Case Study of Erasmus and a French 
Regional Scheme for Studies Abroad”, European Journal of Education, 40 (2): 173-188. 
Poutvaara, P. (2004), “Public Education in an Integrated Europe. Studying to Migrate and Teaching to Stay”, CESifo 
Working Paper, n. 1369. 
Romer, P. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change”, The Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5): S71-S102.  
Rosenzweig, M.R. (2006),  “Global Wage Differences and International Student Flows,” in Collins, Susan M. and Carol 
Graham, ed., Brookings Trade Forum 2006: Global Labor Markets, forthcoming. 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Institute of Higher Education (2007), "Academic ranking of world universities". 
http://www.arwu.org   
Sjaastad, L. (1962), “The Cost and Returns of Human Migration”, The Journal of Political Economy, 70 (5): 80-93. 
Stark, O. (2004), “Rethinking the Brain Drain”, World Development, 1: 15-22. 
Stark, O., Helmenstein, C. and A. Prskawetz (1997), “A Brain Gain with a Brain Drain”, Economics Letters, 55: 227-
234.  
Stark, O., Helmenstein, C. and A. Prskawetz (1998), “Human Capital Depletion, Human Capital Formation, and 
Migration: a Blessing or a “Curse”?”, Economics Letters, 60: 363-367. 
World Values Survey Association. 2000.  http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org   
 
    20
Annex 
 
  TABLE 1 
EMIGRATION OF STUDENTS TO OECD COUNTRIES IN 2008 
 
OECD countries  No. of 
emigrants 
% from total 
students  Non OECD countries  No. of 
emigrants 
% from total 
students 
           
Australia  9 777  0.87  Afghanistan  3 451   
Austria  12 043  4.23  Albania  21 762   
Belgium  11 179  2.78  Algeria  22 356   
Canada  44 185  3.11  Argentina  9 996   
Chile  6 909  0.86  Brazil  24 066  0.40 
Czech Republic  10 109  2.58  Bulgaria  24 945   
Denmark  5 810  2.52  China  437 003  2.32 
Finland  8 001  2.58  Croatia  9 244   
France  62 264  2.88  Cyprus  26 259   
Germany  92 391  4.12  Egypt  8 313   
Greece  30 985  4.86  Hong Kong, China  34 210   
Hungary  7 735  1.87  India  173 114   
Iceland  3 625  21.80  Iran  25 264   
Ireland  18 483  10.35  Iraq  3 735   
Israel  9 789  3.01  Jordan  6 073   
Italy  41 577  2.06  Kuwait  4 357   
Japan  51 648  1.31  Latvia  3 642   
Korea  112 142  3.50  Lebanon  12 705  10.1 
Luxembourg  7 676  99  Morocco  48 868  14.15 
Mexico  26 657  1.02  Pakistan  27 609   
Netherlands  13 670  2.27  Palau  51   
New Zealand  4152  1.70  Palestinian Authority  1 256   
Norway  13 373  6.29  Qatar  1 328   
Poland  38 033  1.76  Russian Federation  37 241  0.37 
Portugal  14 561  3.86  Saudi Arabia  17 315   
Slovak Republic  26 995  11.76  Syrian Arab Republic  7 030   
Spain  24 658  1.38       
Sweden  14 942  3.67       
Switzerland  10 813  4.82       
Turkey  48 324  1.91       
United Kingdom  27 901  1.20       
United States  47 803  0.26       
   
Source: OECD education at glance 2010 
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 Notes: * 
represents 
significance 
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  Definitions 
of variables 





F Income is 
income in 
country F, 
S Income  is 
income in 





Age is the 
age of the 
emigrant, 
Age is the 







countries S and F,  i Education  is the education of emigrant i,  F Unemployment is the rate of unemployment in country F, 
S Unemployment  is the rate of unemployment in country S, Family size − is the size of the emigrant’s family,  i Prv-migration is 
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Dependent variable:   SF M  - Migration from country S  to country F 
---  +*  ---  ---  +*  F Income 1) 
+  ---  ---  -* 
a  ---  S Income 1) 
---  ---  +*  ---  ---  b
i Earnings 2+9) 
-*  -*  -*  -*  ---    Age3+5) 
---  ---  ---  ---  -*  Distance 4) 
+*  +*  +*  +*  +*  i Education 6) 
---  -*  ---  ---  -  F Unemployment 7)  
+*  ---  ---  ---  +*  
S Unemployment 7)  
+  +*&-*  -*  ---  ---  Family size − 8) 
---  (+)*  (+)*  ---  ---  i Prv-migration 10) 
---  ---  ---  ---  +*  Mstock 11)   22
TABLE 3 
 















Rate of migration to European OECD countries with similar structure of higher 
education (%) 
 
84.53  84.60  85.55  81.04  82.10  81.34  Austria 
70.28  70.68  70.60  63.11  61.15  59.42  Belgium 
79.06  83.37  87.93  81.62  81.22  79.57  Czech 
63.93  63.63  65.23  60.06  59.87  57.03  Denmark 
75.54  76.37  75.57  69.29  67.64  65.57  Finland 
69.05  68.71  67.81  57.62  57.02  55.79  France 
73.96  71.69  69.61  61.97  59.61  58.26  Germany 
52.76  53.94  54.67  53.08  55.84  56.68  Greece 
86.13  88.66  91.89  89.58  89.61  90.12  Hungary 
12.01  12.27  12.85  12.65  12.96  12.77  Iceland 
91.23  90.84  90.74  88.71  89.47  89.22  Ireland 
76.03  76.95  79.39  68.93  69.28  70.31  Italy 
88.19  87.99  87.36  87.52  88.15  86.95  Luxembourg 
70.63  59.90  72.14  66.64  66.22  64.83  Netherlands 
60.61  59.00  55.63  54.63  52.43  51.47  Norway 
16.41  10.19  6.12  7.33  6.99  6.71  Poland 
57.25  57.25  59.47  58.77  60.69  61.92  Portugal 
95.79  96.63  97.61  96.60  96.74  96.65  Slovakia 
29.93  29.34  28.39  32.50  34.09  33.64  Spain 
57.73  56.84  57.07  53.01  51.21  50.94  Sweden 
75.10  76.53  74.78  76.67  74.83  73.66  Switzerland 
18.67  17.82  24.61  33.51  34.16  33.44  UK 
Source: Own calculation. 
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TABLE 4  
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TABLE 5 
 










      
Average wage  0.34  0.37  0.33 










Low to Low 
 
Low to High 
 
High to Low 
 
 
High to High 
 
2001 19  48  14  19 
2002 19  48  14  19 
2003 19  47  15  19 
2004 18  49  14  19 
    2005  19  47  15  19 
    2006  20  45  17  18 
Source: Own calculation.   
Notes: “High” represents the top 5 countries according to the quality index of the top 100. According 
to this index the top 5 countries are France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 










Low to Low 
 
Low to High 
 
High to Low 
 
 
High to High 
 
2001 73  15  11  1 
2002 73  15  11  1 
2003 74  15  10  1 
2004 72  16  11  1 
    2005  71  18  9  2 
    2006  70  19  10  1 
Source: Own calculation.   
Notes: “High” represents the top 5 countries in wages. The top 5 countries are Austria, Denmark, 




APPENDIX TABLE 1 
 
MEMBERS OF THE “EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION AREA” 
  
 
Albania   Latvia 
Andorra   Liechtenstein 
Armenia   Lithuania 
Austria   Luxembourg 
Azerbaijan   Malta 
Belgium   Moldova 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   Montenegro 
Bulgaria   Netherlands 
Croatia   Norway 
Cyprus   Poland 
Czech Republic   Portugal 
Denmark   Romania 
Estonia   Russian Federation 
Finland   Serbia   
France   Slovak Republic 
Georgia   Slovenia 
Germany   Spain 
Greece   Sweden 
The Holy See   Switzerland 
Hungary   Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Iceland   Turkey 
Ireland   Ukraine 
Italy 
Kazakhstan 
 United Kingdom 
Source: Bologna Process. http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/aboutthiswebsite   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 